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LANDLUBBERS AS PIRATES: THE LACK OF “HIGH SEAS” 
REQUIREMENT FOR THE INCITEMENT AND INTENTIONAL 
FACILITATION OF PIRACY 
George White∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This commentary seeks to explain and evaluate the reasoning behind the 
recent finding, in United States v. Ali Mohamed Ali, that acts amounting to the 
intentional facilitation or incitement of piracy can constitute piracy in 
international law, and are subject to universal jurisdiction, even when those 
acts occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of a State. It argues that the 
decision has a sound basis in the orthodox rules of treaty interpretation. 
Although some have argued that universal jurisdiction can inhere over acts of 
piracy only where those acts of piracy occur beyond territorial jurisdiction, 
there is a strong legal and principled basis for the contrary conclusion. The 
decision invites a wider discussion of the limits of “intentional facilitation,” 
brief consideration of which suggests that the lack of a high seas requirement 
is likely to be expedient and unproblematic. 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose Defendant D, who remains within the territorial jurisdiction of 
state X, intentionally facilitates acts of piracy, which occur on the high seas, 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state. D then travels to state Y. Has D 
committed piracy under international law and, if so, can Y invoke universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute D for the acts of facilitation he performed within X? 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) in United 
States v. Ali Mohamed Ali recently answered both questions in the affirmative: 
Acts amounting to the intentional facilitation or incitement of piracy can 
constitute piracy in international law and are subject to universal jurisdiction, 
even when those acts occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of a state.1 
 
 ∗ George White received a B.A. (First Class Hons.) in History from University College London and a 
B.A. (Hons.) in Law from the University of Cambridge. He is currently a Bar Professional Training Course 
candidate at City University, London. The author would like to thank the editors of the Emory International 
Law Review for their assistance in preparing this Article. Remaining errors are the author's own. 
 1 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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This ruling runs contrary to numerous academic and judicial proclamations 
that piracy is necessarily committed beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any 
state,2 but the conclusion ultimately should be welcomed. It arose from 
application of the orthodox rules of treaty interpretation and is supported by a 
principled rationale. The case also has wider implications. Brief consideration 
of the problem before the court will facilitate an evaluation of the reasoning in 
Ali, followed by consideration of the broader relevance of that decision. 
Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1982 (UNCLOS).3 Article 101 establishes three ways in which piracy can 
be committed. First, under Article 101(a), D commits piracy for the following: 
[A]ny illegal acts of violence or detention . . . committed for private 
ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft . . . or 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State.4 
Second, under Article 101(b), D commits piracy by “any act of voluntary 
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts 
making it a pirate ship or aircraft.”5 
Third, and most significantly for present purposes, D commits piracy under 
Article 101(c) by “any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”6 
The court in Ali was required to determine whether the acts of facilitation 
in Article 101(c) could occur within the territorial jurisdiction of a state.7 The 
facts giving rise to that question require a brief clarification. 
 
 2 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. 
Supp. 2d 599, 602 (E.D. Va. 2010); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 
4, 37 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume); Id. at 55 (declaration of Judge Ranjeva); Id. at 79 
(joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 26 (Sept. 7); Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 399, 418–19 (2011); Barry H. Dubner, On the Definition of the Crime of Sea Piracy 
Revisited, 42 J. MAR L. & COM. 71, 76 (2011); Yvonne M. Dutton, Maritime Piracy and the Impunity Gap, 86 
TUL. L. REV. 1112, 1124 (2011). 
 3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].  
 4 Id. art. 101(a). The wording of Article 101(a) also extends to other conduct, which is irrelevant for 
present purposes. 
 5 Id. art. 101(b). 
 6 Id. art. 101(c). 
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I. THE FACTS OF ALI 
The defendant, Ali, was a politician in the self-proclaimed Republic of 
Somaliland, situated within Somalia.8 He received an email purporting to 
invite him to a conference in North Carolina but was arrested on arrival in the 
United States.9 Prosecutors alleged that Ali, while in Somali territory, 
negotiated ransom payments on behalf of individuals who had seized a vessel 
on the high seas.10 That seizure would unquestionably constitute piracy under 
UNCLOS Article 101(a). Ali was also alleged to have acted as an interpreter 
between the captors and the captured crew while on board the ship.11 There 
was a period of only “minutes” when Ali was on board the ship while it was 
traversing the high seas, but a lack of evidence rendered it “very difficult” to 
determine precisely when Ali was and was not within the territorial jurisdiction 
of Somalia.12 
Ali had been charged with committing piracy under the law of nations, 
amongst other offenses,13 on the basis that he aided and abetted piracy.14 The 
trial court noted that Congress would arguably have violated international law 
if 18 U.S.C. § 1651, incorporating “the crime of piracy as defined by the law of 
nations”15 into U.S. law, were to “[proscribe] non-high seas conduct.”16 As a 
result of the rebuttable presumption that Congress legislates in accordance with 
international law,17 the charge of aiding and abetting piracy was restricted to 
acts of aiding and abetting committed beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state.18 Conversely, the D.C. Circuit decided that the international law of 
piracy encompassed acts of incitement and intentional facilitation committed 
within state territory, permitting an expansive interpretation of § 1651.19 
 
 7 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 8 Id. at 933. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 932. 
 11 Id. at 933. 
 12 United States v. Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 13 Those offenses were conspiracy to commit piracy, conspiracy to commit hostage taking, and aiding 
and abetting hostage taking. Id. at 56. 
 14 Ali, 718 F.3d at 936. 
 15 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). 
 16 Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d at 32. 
 17 See id. at 24 (citing Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 114 (1804)). 
 18 Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d at 31–32. 
 19 Ali, 718 F.3d at 941. 
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II. THE STARTING-POINT OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by examining the text of UNCLOS 
according to treaty interpretation standards of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT).20 Article 31 of the VCLT states: “A treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”21 
Unlike UNCLOS Article 101(a), Article 101(c) makes no reference to the 
location of the actus reus: “[A]ny act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating 
an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)” suffices.22 Indeed, the United 
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea has also observed 
that Article 101(c) “does not explicitly set forth any particular geographic 
scope.”23 One might well expect express inclusion of any such requirement, 
given its inclusion in Article 101(a). 
Jonathan Bellish has rejected that interpretation, arguing that it is based on 
the false premise that there is a discrepancy between paragraphs (a) and (c).24 
Bellish observes that the “high seas” requirement in (a) relates only to the 
location of the victim, not of the perpetrator.25 If there is no express “high 
seas” requirement in (a), yet still a general consensus that the acts referred to in 
(a) cannot be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of any state, then the 
lack of express “high seas” requirement in (c) is equally unproblematic.26 
That argument is unpersuasive, however. Although it raises legitimate 
questions relating to common interpretations of Article 101(a), it does not 
address the fundamental fact that the language of Article 101(c) is expansive, 
containing no geographical qualification: “[A]ny act of . . . intentional 
 
 20 Id. at 937. 
 21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
VCLT]. 
 22 UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 101(c). 
 23 Id. at 4 n.15. 
 24 Jonathan Bellish, A High Seas Requirement for Inciters and Intentional Facilitators of Piracy Jure 
Gentium and Its (Lack of) Implications for Impunity 11–12 (One Earth Future – Oceans Beyond Piracy 
Project, Working Paper, Feb. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226030. 
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. 
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facilitation” suffices.27 As a result, the court was no doubt correct to start from 
the premise that Article 101(c) entails no “high seas” requirement.28 
The D.C. Circuit, unlike the lower court,29 did not consider the numerous 
academic and judicial opinions to the effect that piracy is necessarily 
committed on the high seas.30 That approach is entirely appropriate because 
“interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty.”31 As the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained in Libya/Chad: “By entering into 
the Treaty, the parties recognized the frontiers to which the text of the Treaty 
referred; the task of the Court is thus to determine the exact content of the 
undertaking entered into.”32 
Despite the ICJ’s holding, Ali raised three challenges to the court’s textual 
interpretation.33 All three were justifiably rejected.34 
III.  ALI’S CONTEXTUAL ARGUMENT 
Ali’s first argument was contextual. UNCLOS Article 86 clarifies that Part 
VII of UNCLOS, including Article 101, applies “to all parts of the sea that are 
not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State.”35 Because VCLT Article 31 requires the terms of a 
treaty to be given their “ordinary meaning . . . in their context,” it could be 
argued plausibly that such a “high seas” requirement should be imputed into 
UNCLOS Article 101(c).36 On this basis, the District Court had “agree[d] with 
Ali that the language of Article 101 cannot override Article 86’s forceful 
statement,”37 with the result that the prosecution was required to demonstrate 
that “Ali intentionally facilitated acts of piracy while he was on the high 
seas.”38 
 
 27 UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 101 (emphasis added). 
 28 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 29 United States v. Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d 17, 31–33 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 30 See generally United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. 
Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 4 
(Feb. 14).  
 31 Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 22 (Feb. 3). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Ali, 718 F.3d at 935. 
 34 Id. at 946. 
 35 UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 86. 
 36 VCLT, supra note 21, art. 31. 
 37 Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d at 32 n.20; see also Bellish, supra note 24, at 15. 
 38 Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d at 32. 
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The D.C. Circuit was no doubt correct to reject that argument on the basis 
that such an interpretation would cause “numerous redundancies.”39 Although 
the court justified that interpretative approach with reference municipal 
precedent,40 international law similarly requires a treaty to be interpreted so 
that words are not deprived of their effect: “It would indeed be incompatible 
with the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of 
this sort occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of purport or 
effect.”41 
As the D.C. Circuit noted, express references to “the high seas” in other 
provisions would be utterly without effect if Article 86 imputed a general 
“high seas” requirement for every provision within Part VII.42 Furthermore, 
certain provisions within Part VII simply cannot be restricted to the high seas. 
For instance, the court drew attention to Article 92(1), prohibiting flag-
changing in a port of call, and to Article 100, concerning “the repression of 
piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State.”43 
According to the D.C. Circuit, Article 86 merely explicates “the term ‘high 
seas’ for that portion of the treaty most directly discussing such issues.”44 This 
interpretation conforms with UNCLOS Article 2, the first provision of 
UNCLOS Part II, which clarifies the meaning and status of the “territorial 
sea.”45 Article 34, introducing Part III, similarly clarifies the extent and status 
of internationally navigable straits: the waters to which Part III relates.46 A 
properly contextual reading of UNCLOS, recognizing this pattern, suggests 
that Article 38 “makes the most sense as an introduction to Part IV . . . and not 
as a limit on jurisdictional scope.”47 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has since arrived at the same conclusion.48 
 
 39 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 40 Id. (citing Dean v United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573 (2009)) (“Where Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 41 Corfu Channel (U.K. v Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 24 (April 9). 
 42 Ali, 718 F.3d at 937. 
 43 Id. (citations omitted). 
 44 Id. at 938. 
 45 UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 2. 
 46 Id. art. 34 
 47 Ali, 718 F.3d at 938. 
 48 United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Article 86 serves only as a general 
introduction . . . . It does not purport to limit the more specific structure and texts contained in Article 101.”) 
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IV.  ALI’S JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Ali’s second argument was jurisdictional. He argued that, even if the 
substantive crime of piracy could be committed by facilitation from within 
Somalia, UNCLOS Article 105 limits universal jurisdiction over piracy. This 
Article provides: 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or 
aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State 
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be 
imposed.49 
Ali argued that jurisdiction conferred by Article 105 was unavailable to the 
prosecution because Ali was apprehended within U.S. territory.50 Ali’s 
assumption that Article 105 displaced any residual bases of territorial or 
universal jurisdiction might appear warranted by the Security Council’s 
repeated affirmations that “international law, as reflected in [UNCLOS], in 
particular its [A]rticles 100, 101 and 105, sets out the legal framework 
applicable to countering piracy.”51 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit rejected Ali’s 
argument. 
Instead, Article 105 was understood to merely illustrate “the broad 
authority of nations to apprehend pirates even in international waters.”52 
Explaining that interpretation, the court contemplated the absurdity of a 
situation in which a state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute a known pirate purely 
because the pirate was found within its territory, rather than outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of any state.53 Such an argument nonetheless overlooks 
the controversy surrounding the prosecution of pirates by so-called “third 
states,” which lack any connection to defendant or their arrest.54 
 
 49 UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 105. 
 50 Ali, 718 F.3d at 938. 
 51 S.C. Res. 2039 ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2039 (February 29, 2012) (emphasis added); S.C. Res. 2018 ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/2018 (October 31, 2011); S.C. Res. 2015 ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (October 24, 2011); 
S.C. Res. 1976 ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (April 11, 2011); S.C. Res. 1918 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (April 
27, 2010).  
 52 Ali, 718 F.3d at 938. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National Pirates Captured by Third States 
under Kenyan and International Law, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 363 (2009); Eugene Kontorovich, 
International Decisions–United States v. Shi, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 739 (2009). 
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Despite such problems, the court’s conclusion must be correct. In a Dutch 
case, not discussed by the D.C. Circuit, the defendant had been apprehended 
on the high seas by Danish forces.55 The Rotterdam District Court 
convincingly rejected the idea that the jurisdiction provided by Article 105 
“would prevent the execution of universal jurisdiction based on the national 
law of [states other than the apprehending state],”56 indicating that Article 105 
cannot be an exhaustive statement of circumstances under which pirates may 
be prosecuted. Such exclusivity, it reasoned, “cannot be concluded from the 
text of the provision, nor is there any other clue that this would have been 
intended.”57 State practice, which consists of the prosecution of pirates other 
than by the apprehending state and without any jurisdictional nexus to the 
prosecuting state,58 supports that outcome and lends credence to the approach 
in Ali. 
Although the D.C. Circuit was consequently correct that Article 105 did not 
restrict the scope of universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy, some might 
question its assumption that universal jurisdiction inhered over Ali’s conduct 
in the first place. Judges Buergenthal, Higgins, and Kooijmans of the ICJ have, 
for instance, observed: “[T]he only clear example of an agreed exercise of 
universal jurisdiction was in respect of piracy, outside of any territorial 
jurisdiction.”59 Indeed, there is a wealth of authority to suggest that the 
“universal jurisdiction” inhering over piracy is premised on the assumption 
that piracy is necessarily committed beyond any territorial jurisdiction.60 These 
arguments seem to be premised on a distortion of the term “universal 
 
 55 The “Cygnus” Case (Somali Pirates), 145 I.L.R. 491, 491–92 (Rb. Rotterdam 2010) (Neth.).  
 56 Id. at 494.  
 57 Id.; see also DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 40–41 (2009); 
Maggie Gardner, Piracy Prosecutions in National Courts, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 797, 804–05 (2012).  
 58 See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721–23 (9th Cir. 2008); Republic v. Mohamed Ahmed Ise, 
Crim. Side No. 75 of 2010, ¶ 22 (S.C.) (Sey.), available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/ 
documents/CR75-2010-Judgment.pdfs; see also United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 608 (E.D. Va. 
2010); Republic v Abdukar Ahmed, Crim. Side No. 21 of 2011, ¶ 3 (S.C.) (Sey.), available at http://law.case. 
edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/CR21-2011-Judgment.pdf; Republic v Mohamed Aweys Sayid, Crim. 
Side, No.19 of 2010, ¶ 37, (S.C.) (Sey.), available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/ 
CR19-2010-Judgment1.pdf. 
 59 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 4, 37 (Feb. 14) (separate 
opinion of Judges Higgins, Buergenthal and Kooijmans) (emphasis added). 
 60 See supra text accompanying note 2; see also Harvard Research in Int’l Law, The Comment to the 
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L. L. (Supp.) 443, 566 (1935). But see 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1666, 1667 (2013) (“Piracy typically occurs on the 
high seas, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any other country.” (emphasis added)).  
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jurisdiction,” which is “an unfortunately misleading label, given the separate 
meaning that term has since acquired in international criminal law.”61 
Modern references to “universal jurisdiction” generally encapsulate the 
idea that “a State has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for 
certain offenses” where another jurisdictional nexus to the forum state is 
lacking.62 In the context of piracy, however, the term is often used in reference 
to the universal right to enforce such prescriptions on the high seas.63 Despite 
this, that latter right is not truly “universal,” because a state’s “right to seize 
pirate ships . . . and to have them adjudicated upon by its court . . . cannot be 
exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State.”64 Because 
“[j]urisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce are logically independent 
of each other,”65 there is no reason why international law should not uphold the 
universality of the former while restricting the latter. 
A principled rationale for that outcome can be identified. Although some 
have suggested that universal jurisdiction over piracy is premised on its 
occurrence on the high seas,66 that explanation cannot account for the lack of 
equivalent regimes governing narcotics trafficking and illegal broadcasting on 
the high seas, for instance. Furthermore, unlike war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, the peculiarities of the piracy regime cannot be justified with 
reference to “heinousness,”67 especially given that “malicious acts against 
 
 61 GUILFOYLE supra note 57, at 27. 
 62 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404(a)(1) (1986). 
 63 See, e.g., ROBIN GEISS & ANNA PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND THE GULF OF ADEN 143‒44 (2011) (“In the 
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, Judge Guillaume of the International Court of Justice stated that 
‘international law knows only one true case of universal jurisdiction: piracy.’ This statement is potentially 
misleading, since it is not clear what Judge Guillaume meant . . . . Certainly, universal adjudicative jurisdiction 
exists over other crimes . . . [but] it may well be argued that piracy is an exceptional case, since every State is 
competent to take enforcement measures against pirate ships.”); Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence 
at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 15 
(2007) (“Universal jurisdiction actually solves the problem of enforcement.”); see also ILIAS BANTEKAS & 
SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 157 (2003) (“[I]t is clear that Article 105 does confer universal 
jurisdiction on State parties with regard to piracy.”); Bellish, supra note 24, at 14 (“[T]he importance of article 
105 cannot be overstated, as it is that provision that codifies universal jurisdiction over piracy.”).  
 64 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 8th Sess., April 23–July 4, 1956, U.N. Doc. A/3159; GAOR, 11th Sess., 
Supp. No. 9, reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, 253, 289, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1; 
see also Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735, 740 
(2004).  
 65 O’Keefe, supra note 64, at 741. 
 66 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 67 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J., 183, 210–23 (2004). 
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inanimate objects,” can constitute acts of piracy.68 The best explanation of 
modern universal jurisdiction over piracy seems to be that, because “piracy 
endangers a common interest of all states (high-seas freedom of navigation), 
the exclusive jurisdiction of flag states does not obtain.”69 The same rationale 
would justify the exercise by all states of prescriptive and adjudicative 
jurisdiction over land-based aiding and abetting, which equally jeopardize that 
same common interest. 
V. ALI’S HISTORICAL ARGUMENT 
Ali’s third argument was characterized as “eschew[ing] UNCLOS’s text in 
favor of its drafting history—or, rather, its drafting history’s drafting 
history.”70 The definition of piracy in UNCLOS Article 101 is materially 
identical to that in Article 15 of the High Seas Convention (HSC) of 1958.71 
This drew heavily on the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy which the 
International Law Commission (ILC) was “in general . . . able to endorse,” 
when preparing the draft articles for use in HSC.72 As Ali noted,73 the Harvard 
research made clear that: “The act of instigation or facilitation is not subjected 
to the common jurisdiction unless it takes place outside territorial 
jurisdiction.”74 
If the Harvard research were accepted as determinative, this would have 
surely been decisive. Nonetheless, it is surprising that neither Ali nor the court 
referred to the ILC commentary to what became HSC Article 15, which is 
somewhat less historically remote than the Harvard research. That commentary 
emphatically states: “Piracy can be committed only on the high seas or in a 
place situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State, and cannot be 
committed within the territory of a State or in its territorial area.”75 
However, no such supplementary materials informed the court’s 
interpretation. As is well-known, the preparatory work of the treaty and other 
 
 68 See Institute of Cetacean v Sea Shepherd, 708 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 69 GUILFOYLE, supra note 57, at 28; see also Clyde H. Crockett, Toward a Revision of the International 
Law of Piracy, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 81 (1976‒77). 
 70 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 71 Convention on the High Seas, art. 15, 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 
 72 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 25, 10th Sess., May 2‒July 8, 1955, U.N. Doc. A/2934; GAOR, 10th 
Sess., Supp. No. 9, reprinted in [1955] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N., 19, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955. 
 73 Ali, 718 F.3d at 938. 
 74 Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT’L. L. (Supp.) 822 (1932).  
 75 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 64, at 253. 
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“supplementary means of interpretation” are determinative only when VCLT 
Article 31 “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”76 Having rejected Ali’s 
contextual and jurisdictional arguments, the court was no doubt correct to 
conclude that “weighing the relevance of scholarly work that indirectly 
inspired UNCLOS is not an avenue open to [it].”77 
As a result, the D.C. Circuit’s starting premise remained intact: Because the 
language of Article 101(c) is expansive and contains no “high seas” 
requirement, there is no such requirement in international law. There was no 
reason to narrow the charges to acts of aiding and abetting occurring beyond 
the territorial jurisdiction of any state. 
VI.  WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE LACK OF “HIGH SEAS” REQUIREMENT 
If the recent decision in Ali is followed, the rejection of any “high seas” 
requirement under Article 101(c) could have a dramatic impact on the 
suppression of Somali piracy, in addition to further unforeseen and arguably 
problematic consequences. Nonetheless, consideration of the proper scope of 
“intentional facilitation” suggests that such fears are unwarranted. 
The prosecution of Ali, coupled with the recent prosecution of another 
pirate negotiator,78 seemingly forms part of a strategy to dismantle the 
organizational and economic structures sustaining piracy.79 As observed by the 
Office of the U.N. Secretary General, the prosecution of the “relatively small 
number of individuals[,] who provide the leadership and financial management 
of piracy,” most likely presents one of the more “strategically effective 
and . . . cost-effective” responses to piracy.80 Given that the proliferation of 
Somali piracy depends on the “effective informal banking sector” which 
 
 76 VCLT, supra note 21, art. 32. 
 77 Ali, 718 F.3d at 939. 
 78 See United States v. Shibin, Crim. Act. No. 2:11cr33, 2012 WL 8231152 (E.D. Va. April 16, 2012); 
United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 79 See, e.g., Hearing on Update on Efforts to Combat Piracy Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(Statement of Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs), available at http:// 
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2013/207361.htm.  
 80 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Establishment of 
Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 (Jun. 15 2011). 
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handles the proceeds of ransoms,81 the use of Article 101(c) to prosecute land-
based facilitators has a sound policy rationale. 
However, it will be recalled that Ali was only prosecuted because he 
travelled to the U.S. as “Director General of the Ministry of Education for the 
Republic of Somaliland,” having been invited to a “sham” education 
conference in the U.S.82 The uncertain meaning of “intentionally facilitate,”83 
coupled with the “widely known” political connections of pirate leaders,84 
could arguably jeopardize international development efforts by deterring other 
Somali leaders from engaging with future such overseas reconstruction 
efforts.85 
More strikingly, the lack of any “high seas” requirement raises the question 
of whether “paying ransom to pirates could even be regarded as piracy itself” 
on the basis that such payments have been “proven to facilitate piracy in 
Somalia.”86 In view of the extent to which the shipping, financial and 
insurance sectors rely on the lawfulness of ransom payments in jurisdictions 
such as the U.K.,87 the effective criminalization of ransom payment as “piracy” 
could have far-reaching commercial consequences. In addition, the same 
reasoning threatens to label as “pirates” those who donate to anti-whaling 
groups, such as Sea Shepherd.88 The decision in Ali consequently necessitates 
urgent clarification of the phrase “intentionally facilitate.” 
Although the district court held that the municipal definition of “aiding and 
abetting [is] functionally equivalent” to intentional facilitation under art 
101(c),89 the precise limits of intentional facilitation in international law have 
 
 81 Douglas Guilfoyle, Somali Pirates as Agents of Change in International Law-making and 
Organisation, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 81, 88 (2012). 
 82 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933. 
 83 Roger L. Phillips, Pirate Accessory Liability—Developing a Modern Legal Regime Governing 
Incitement and Intentional Facilitation of Maritime Piracy, FL. J. INT’L. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2158023.  
 84 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 80, ¶ 64. 
 85 Certain individuals with links to piracy have been issued with diplomatic passports precisely for this 
reason. Exclusive: Somali Pirate Kingpins Enjoy “Impunity”‒U.N. Experts, REUTERS, Jul. 17, 2012, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/us-somalia-un-piracy-idUSBRE86G0ZN20120717. 
 86 Andreas S. Kolb, Tim René Salomon, & Judith Udich, Paying Danegeld to Pirates—Humanitarian 
Necessity or Financing Jihadists?, 15 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF UNITED NATIONS L. 105, 121 n.57 (2011). 
 87 See Michael Peel, Somali Crackdown Threatens City Ransom Role, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8 2010), http:// 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b63413c-a31a-11df-8cf4-00144feabdc0.html. 
 88 Sea Shepherd was recently held to have committed acts of piracy. Institute of Cetacean v Sea 
Shepherd, 708 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 89 Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d at 30 (citing Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 821(2009)). 
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been left undefined. The district court held that U.S. law required an aider and 
abettor to have “the specific intent to facilitate the commission of a crime,” but 
no corresponding requirement of specific intent is evident from the text of 
Article 101(c). 
When the text of Article 101(c) is read in the context of wider international 
law, as prescribed by VCLT Article 31(3)(3), it in fact seems likely that the 
mens rea threshold for intentional facilitation is lower. According to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): “In the 
case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the 
acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the specific 
crime of the principal.”90 
Assuming the “intentional facilitation” limb of Article 101 corresponds to 
aiding and abetting,91 such a low mens rea threshold, coupled with the lack of 
a “high seas” requirement, threatens to create a surprisingly broad definition of 
piracy. 
Nonetheless, recent developments in international criminal law may present 
another way of preventing ransom payments, or donations to Sea Shepherd, 
from constituting “intentional facilitation.” The ICTY has recently affirmed 
that the actus reus of aiding and abetting must be “specifically directed to 
assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific 
crime,” rather than merely “‘in some way” directed towards relevant crimes.92 
While more detailed consideration of “intentional facilitation” is beyond the 
scope of this commentary, an analogous threshold would serve to limit the 
problems arising from applying the law of piracy to land-based aiders and 
abettors. 
 
 90 Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 102 (Feb. 25, 
2004); see also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49 (Jul. 29, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1,Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 245 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 545 (Sep. 2, 1998). 
 91 Ali, 885 F.Supp.2d at 30; Republic v. Mohamed Ahmed Dahir, Criminal Side No. 51 of 2010, ¶ 63 
(S.C.) (Sey.), available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/CR51-2009-Judgment.pdf 
(convicting a defendant of aiding and abetting piracy on the basis that “a person abets by aiding, when by any 
act done either prior to, or at the time of, the commission of an act, he intends to facilitate, and does in fact 
facilitate, the commission thereof” (emphasis added)); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, art. 25(3)(c), July 17 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 92 Prosecutor v Perišić, IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 26‒27 (Feb. 28, 2013).  
